Friday, February 23, 2018

Still reading about spectre fixes

And the fixes, the tools to pre-check user codes, the compiler options, all that, I read as software methods and system to secure protocol execution. Clear as day to me. They have great analysis tools, easily reused for stable protocol proofing.

The interaction between kernel and protocol is always bounded by stable calls to notary guaranteeing the protocol is stable in the event of kernel interruption.  

So, basically take a batch of linux kernel techies and have them repurpose their industry a bit, make bigger do-re-me. They should at least know what discovered the bug. It was no accident, Google and Microsoft and Intel started this as  a protocol machinery project.  Intel SGX conceived for secure protocol years prior.

Our security problem is verifying a valid processor. A shady bank could buy a decomposed processor board with built in hardware cheats and put it on the web.  Chip foundries will solve that, a hardware secret key is worth do-re-me.  Foundries can verify remotely without human eyes. If Intel can do that than go ahead, triple your price, and send me a check.

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