That is a lower bound on the utility of the fiat. The entitlement beneficiaries are the first ones pained when the fiat stumbles. Hence, a firm guarantee the voters won't let the fiat stumble beyond a lower bound. The utility of the fiat trumps the cost of over running the seigniorage account.
Even a break up of the dollar zone poses little fiat risk, large obligations mostly are bargained across the divide, in proportion. The utility of the fiat inherits in a currency change, money realy is a lot more neutral than we presume. Utility of paper cash is very high relative to other components of retail.
But fiat stability hinges on this lock with voters, who usually own the fiat by government. Voters want the utility of the fiat, that sets a protection against government hyperinflation, even in a mal-proportioned democracy. Investors who can estimate the lower bound in acceptable voter risk can calibrate monetary risk costs.
Say, for example, Texas opts for its own currency during a short term default. Is this legal? Sure, as long as Texas notes where it has assumed authority, so that its operations can be resolved later. Texas is duty bound to keep stability within Texas when ordinary pocesses in DC are disrupted. So no problem for Texas to use a temporary currency, as they might use a temporary IOU the other way around.
If US parties agree to a permanent currency dissolution , then Texas is motivated to take its share of entitlement obligations back home, in the negotiations. The government, even governments at political separation, always protect the fiat, always try to maintain fair and proportional dissolutions. The Hamilton Complex, the desire to back up the fiat by keeping promises, is natural because the utility of owning the fiat agency is too great to pass up.
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