Repeated games with private monitoring

Try this summary.
You know we are going to attack the problem with quantum side channels, and you know we are going to spot the fixed sample period assumptions.  Game theory is going to change as researchers adopt quantum information theory, which is being developed outside of economics.
Thoma says look here:
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Erradner/publishedpapers/56RepeatedPrincipalAgent.pdf

I look and find fixed sample period right away, so I get this is unlikely a maximum entropy analysis.  Should I pursue this?   
In this post, Thoma presents the naughty-nice function as convex, hence having no global minimum.  But agents under repeated games will produce  imprecision using quanta production to convert the convex into a volatile concave. Change the norm, minimum variance becomes minimum redundancy (maximum entropy).
I am gonna dig up Neils Bohr, his dead corpse could swat these softballs.