Not really

Afghan vet reviews the war:

Through it all, the American people were told by their leadership that progress was just around the corner. The senior officers in charge of implementing a failed strategy refused to level with Americans about just how difficult the circumstances were.
The Taliban’s resurgence is the inevitable outcome of an inadequate organizational structure and an ineffective strategy. The Taliban in 2001 consisted of large units organized under a tribal military chain of command driven by a religious ideology. The U.S. won by March 2002, but instead of recognizing victory and departing, Washington took on greater responsibility by building political and security organizations that would lead to a Taliban resurgence, unparalleled corruption across the political system and an 18-plus-year conflict. By 2004, the Taliban took advantage of a sanctuary in Pakistan to reorganize, recruit and fundraise while co-opting village elders across the border. By 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent organizations had a foothold across Afghanistan.

Most of us knew that Afghanistan would return to the same nutty place it has always been. They live way up in the center of nowhere, completely isolated, stuck with a stone age philosophy. They are frigged, soon Iran will be bombing them, they are simply nuts.

This was not Vietnam, the original goal was modest, bomb religious nuts from B52s, while wasting the trillions that  Reagan spent on exotic, worthless bombers.