Sandbox S/Ls do it different

For example, I will join a run on a bank if I expect that other people will. Without deposit insurance, customers have incentives to avoid banks vulnerable to runs.

THOMAS J. SARGENT at PS ding the old standard.

In sandbox, for example, I will join a run on a bank if I expect others to do so, in a fair traded look at the trade book.  And we all expect the S/L to go bankrupt,  bankruptcy gains are plus or minus one bounded error value, about a quarter point of assets  I held prior to the failure. Shared among loans and deposits.

Sandbox is fair traded, all parties look at the updated trade book with equal access\, and by contract, the pit boss might carry a bounded quarter point of market risk.

The sandbox S/L dumps time, it is paced by asynchronous fair access, allowing the pit  to dump risk onto traders and automate liquidity allocation with a pit boss.  So, given the inability of a bot to own property, there is a relative smooth run down of the pit, it becomes unpopular, ad revenue goes down.

The sandbox should do term loans if designed along the line of my proposal, or variations of it; as found to the right on this blog. Sandboxers create models by constructing them and depositing them into the our liquidity net and having lots of independent Monte Carlo bots track the optimum settling point so our model. Our basic expectation is that when people are around things they like they will click their plastic smart cards. Mr. Monte Carlo does the rest.