Swapping the instruction cache for trusted miners

Why it is provable complete with pricable race conditions.

The closed protocol witll have meeting points where one or more parties is reqired to et service from a trusted miner.  At tat point, the contractmakes a secure swap call to the kernel entry point and tat part of the instruction cache is duplicated to secure memory and erased in the cache.

After the trusted miners respond, all that are reqired, then the contract is securely swapped back into cache and allowed to run as 'first to complete' (there is no other path in the network faster than local cache instructions).

The trusted miners bot issue calls to external ledgers and monitor external ledger queues. They have a time limit to get back to the original contract, and the longer they wait the higher the contract fees paid to the counter party (which is in the contract).

Upon exiting the contract (leaving the instruction cache) one party may discover the counterparty waited longer, then cancelled its ledger entry.  But the scofflaw pays a price to do so, a price sufficient to hire the contract bots or pay an insurance premium.  These are fails to deliver, and they are expected, if not required to happen as they define the boundary cost of insurance.

Blockchain and other consensus algorithms are assume to be working in the ledgers, and this has little to do with  ledger technology, except at the interface.  The trusted miners expect the ledgers to offer cancel within timeout in the ledger or on the entry queue. Ledger operators may be the same as trusted miner.  Ledger fees for cancel within timeout are set independently, likely queue priced.

Tis instruction cache is where? In th standard linux processor with Spectre capability in the kernel, a complete microcode instruction set for secure cache management, with secure memory and key handling capability.

The point of counterfeit here is the processor itself, and it must hold it own secret key for self verification on an ad hoc request basis.  All the finite contracts are provable, apriori, giving a risk cost depending on the counterparty prequals. So the conguration establishes a typical prequal for auto loans, say. Anyone haig the adge and agreeing to the ledger service, has automatic cash in advance and can go car shopping, both parties having known apriori fraud risk, both parties using the standard car loan contract and one of the banks will run a Spectre compatible cache for a fee.

Where is the problem? You need infrastructure to chase scofflaws, but that is the same infrastructure to manage prequal badges.  Silicon Valley doing that for us, as we speak. If we allow cussing we can get some linux pros to make the cache system.