What would the Nobels think of inequality?

 Unfair bidding. The bottom of the risk adjusted have no S/L, risk tolerance gets eaten up by the unfari S/L system of central banking.

Solution? Lower transaction costs and open up  larger set of S/L platforms with free Swift for multi step pricing and enforced bidding contracts. Illiquidity is not having a pit when you need one. The Nobels would be and likely are sandbox all the way, pure liquidity.

The prize winners would support stable, provable contracts enforced under fair exit rules. Enough auction closure to price uncertainty fairly. The automated pits can do that, fairly.

They would support Due Process banking, a legal requirement in government contracts of this sort. They would support a government devaluation bound by repeatable, closed auctions. They would support Swift for all and limited bearer cash.

Their theory could recast Krugman agglomeration into a series of price auctions, which can be cast as a value net flow. Their theory naturally emits quatization and stable points. Their theory meets the Lucas criteria, the dots all connected u to a bound error.

Their theory should greatly influence anything that MIT might recommend to the Fed on digital money.