The warnings gave the wrong message

The flight crew on the March 10 Ethiopian flight faced a barrage of alerts in the flight that lasted just 6 minutes. Those alerts included a “stick shaker” that noisily vibrated the pilot’s yoke throughout the flight, warning the plane was in danger of a stall, which it wasn’t; repeated loud “DON’T SINK” warnings that the jet was too close to the ground; a “clacker” making a very loud clicking sound to signal the jet was going too fast; and multiple warning lights telling the crew the speed, altitude and other readings on their instruments were unreliable.

Instead of clack and buzz why didn't the warning system simply state the 'MCAS was diving the plane and to please shut if off' ? In fact, the warning system should have known it was an auto response causing the problem, and shut if off automatically. Boeing knew the problem, why wasn't the solution programmed into the flight management?

Because the warning system had no over all concept to the plane, its motion and flight plan. The plane still does not, and the plane will remain a concoction of unrelated software system doing contradictory things.

What is the software design goal? Communicate, communicate, communicate.