Friday, June 21, 2019

Sandboxing the New Fed

It is really deposits, loans and defaults.  Entry and exit payoff should be almost independent and serve as collateral, lowering bankruptcy costs.

So, deposits, loans and defaults, three colors from three generators.  The default process simply dumps a ton of debt when deposits and loans are neutral, combined to balanced generators. When everything is fine, boom, hit them with an inflation spike.

Deposits will build up, have a skew relative to loans. Hey, no problem, the algorithm can jump in and balance the queues, making income to the currency account.  It is a balanced queue problem, Wienerized by the equal access to trade board. The algorithm fits the three generators into the fixed channel. No problemo.

But, it is still a queue balancing problem, the pit boss runs up and down the 2-D queues, changing items per basket in three colors, making white in the channel.  It is all about getting that generator skew balanced and combined; the bit error should be low. I see no need for the currency risk account to be more than a half point from contract. Loans and deposits at the pit should be about 4% variation usually, enough to cover geography and season.  Transaction costs? Assume zero. This is a curve with white noise, spikes where unexpected clashes happen in the default process. No problemo. Government agencies will be inside the inside box, they are part of deposits and loans. They pay congestion fees. We expect them to open and close accounts at will, or with aggregater banks. They have to bet their own illiquidity, they get productive quickly.

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